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RECENT DECISIONS

LIBEL AND SLANDER -

555

PRIVILEGED REPORTS OF PUBLIC PROCEEDINGS

CONFESSION TO PROSECUTING ATTORNEY IMPLICATING PLAINTIFF -

Defendant published in its newspaper the contents of confessions made to a
prosecuting attorney by third parties, implicating plaintiff in crimes for which
he had been indicted but the commission of which he denied. In an action for damages for libel, held, that the taking of the confession was neither a judicial proceeding nor an official proceeding authorized by law, and therefore its publication was not privileged. Caller Times Publishing Co. v. Chandler, (Tex.

1939) 130 S. W. (2d) 853.
The perplexing problem of certainty and flexibility, conflicting desiderata of
any legal system, is conspicuous in that field of privileged publication concerned
with the printing and circulation of reports of public proceedings. The applicable rule of qualified privilege, which results fundamentally from a balancing
of public as against private interests, was an easy victim of a judicial crystallization which restricted its application to inflexible, arbitrary categories. Judicial
and official proceedings have been the principal of these,1 and most of the cases,
disregarding the really basic issue, turn on the question whether or not the
particular facts can be so classified.2 Depositions have been excluded from
privilege because they are not a part of judicial proceedings until introduced in
evidence.8 Pleadings have generally met the same fate/ on the ground that
"there must be at least so much of a public investigation as is implied in a submission to the judicial mind with a view to judicial action." 5 Whether a certain
matter is privileged as an official proceeding has sometimes depended upon the
fine distinction between acts required of the official and those which he is
authorized to perform.6 The principal case seems to make some use of this
mechanical reasoning.7 A more logical approach would be concerned directly\
with the conflicting interests involved; mere definition of terms would not
In general, see HARPER, ToRTS, § 250 (1933); 36 C. J. 1273 (1924); 3 ToRTS
RESTATEMENT, § 6II (1938).
2
This tendency is probably abetted by the statutes in most jurisdictions which
expressly make judicial and official proceedings privileged. But they are merely declaratory of the common law. 24 M1cH. L. REV. 489 at 491 (1926). Hence, they should
not be regarded as exclusive.
8
Mannix v. Portland Telegram, 144 Ore. 172, 23 P. (2d) 138 (1933);
United States v. United States Shoe Machinery Co., (D. C. Mass. 1912) 198 F. 870.
~ HARPER, ToRTS, § 250 (1933); 17 R. C. L. 347 (1917); Cowley v. Pulsifer,
137 Mass. 392 (1884); Park v. Detroit Free Press, 72 Mich. 560, 40 N. W. 731, I
L. R. A. 599 (1888). A statute making pleadings privileged was upheld in Heimlich
v. Dispatch Printing Co., 6 Ohio App. 394 (1917).
5
.
36 C. J. 1276 (1924).
6
A.H. Belo & Co. v. Lacy, (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) 111 S. W. 215; Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. McDavid, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 173 S. W. 467.
7
The court argued that the taking of the confession was not an official proceeding because "the law does not require" that the prosecuting attorney take confessions, but
merely "empowers" him to do so. Semble, Jastrzembski v. Marxhausen, 120 Mich.
677 at 682, 79 N. W. 935 (1899), wherein the court said, "The publication was not
privileged. The conversation between the officer and plaintiff's wife was not a judicial
.mvesttgatton
. . .•••''
1
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supply the answer. Then, even though the decisions might still be the same, the
ratjo decidendi would be more convincing. Admittedly influenced by a spirited
law review discussion, 8 one respected court, in bringing pleadings within the
qualified privilege, discarded "frivolous legal fictions" in favor of a rule
"consistent with practical experience." 9 Another court, in a more recent case,1°
came to the same conclusion as to pleadings, but by the medium of the old
rationale and not upon a wholesome, express consideration of first principles.
Yet it cannot be conceded that the liberal view would be the more practical.
Modern news agencies, in attempting to stretch the doctrine of privileged publication, are seldom serving a true public interest, but rather seeking primarily
to increase circulation at the expense of private, individual interests by satisfying a morbid curiosity in stories lurid and sensational. For that reason judicial
reliance on an established classification, which would make even less likely the
possibility of bringing under priVJ1ege situations such as the principal case
presents, is not without merit, and newspapers which must submit to it will be
unable to evoke heartfelt sympathy.11
James D. Ritchie

8 24 M1cH. L. REV. 489 at 492 (1926): "the real question is not whether this
is or is not a judicial proceeding, but: are the interests involved sufficient to warrant
allowing a privilege.••." Have the courts carefully developed a sound rule or "merely
blundered on it through an inborn desire to protect reputation?" The issue should not
be one "merely of a definition of terms."
9 Campbell v. New York Evening Post, 245 N. Y. 320 at 326, 157 N. E. 153
( 19 27). The court recognized that incongruities had arisen as "the inevitable result
of the endeavor of the courts to mitigate by piecemeal the harshness of the old rules
which protected only reports of trials in open court." Logically, it was a question of
allowing publication of pleadings or withholding privilege until after final judgment.
Accord, Siegel v. Sun Printing & Publishing Assn., 130 Misc. 18, 223 N. Y. S.
549 (1927). Se_e also, Mengel v. Reading Eagle Co., 241 Pa. 367, 88 A. 660 (1913).
1 ° Kurata v. Los Angeles News Publishing Co., 4 Cal. App. (2d) 224, 40 P.
(2d) 520 (1935).
11 lt has been suggested that drawing a line is perhaps not ignoring first principles
but rather applying the results of a balancing of social interests. However illogical in
itself, "the line must be drawn somewhere, and there will always be a number of cases
on the border· line of any doctrine. The trend of the present development of the law
to recognize and protect new rights such as the right of privacy would seem to make
any court hesitate, in this age of glaring headlines, to open the doors to newspapers to
publish with impunity any libelous matter contained in a complaint, where a summons
has only been served and filed." 52 A. L. R. 1438 at 1442 (1928).

